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monetary economies: Keynes's economic
mployment-free economy. / Fernando J.
ee. 2.DoutrinaKeynesiana, I. Titulo, II Série.
 “UFRI/FEA-IETI
BIBLIOTECA 
ECONOMICPOLICIES FOR MONETARY ECONOMIES
Keynes's Economic Policy Proposals for an Unemployment-
free Economy
“T look forward with every emotion of satisfaction to the
prospectthat the world may be forced in my lifetime to the sub-
stitution of a scientific control of the lever which works the bal-
ancing factor in our economiclife.”
John Maynard Keynes, April 1930
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-70s we have been witnessing an
unexpectedly strong and durable rise of a new conservative wave
in economictheory and policy. Its main target was the perceived
dominance of Keynesian views among policy-makers and
macroeconomists. The counter-revolution moves forward under
many guises. Friedmanite monetarism, new classical policy
irrelevance theorems, Ricardian equivalence models, all of these
in the theoretical arena; supply side incentives, independence for
central banks, privatization and deregulation, balance budget
amendments,all in the policy field. All these proposals aim at a
common enemy: the interventionist ideas attributed to
Keynesianism. That Keynesian theory itself or, for that matter,
Keynes’s own writings, could hardly be blamed for policies like
nationalization, for instance, did not deflect conservative
criticisms because Keynesians wereat least guilty of allowing
any crackpot ideas on the responsibilities of the state over the
economic sphere to find an audience. For conservative
ideologues, Keynesianism should be condemned on moral
groundsjust for having given legitimacy to the encroachment by
the State on private life.?
2Among
numerous worksofcriticism of Keynes and Keynesianism,see,
for instance, Buchanan (1987) and Ture (1985).
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Models ofpolitical business cycles were created based onthe idea that policy-makers suffer from a disease calledinflationary bias (Cukierman, 1994). Society as a whole isconsidered myopic in its intertemporal preferences, incapable ofrealizing the future gains to be expected of present Sacrifices,Politicians would then cater for the demands of such a society,trading a solid future for immediate but ephemerous benefits,such as creating inflation, risking long-term Stability, to obtainshort-lived increases in employment. Keynes wasto blamefor allthis confusion because he attacked sound finance and gaveStrength to those who think that Prosperity can be reached bymeans other than hard work and abstention. Keynes’s messagewas subversive, undermining the attempts to keep society’s self-destructive impulses under control.
Under the flag of the Natural Rate of Unemployment,activist monetary and fiscal policies were attacked in theacademy, and were on the verge of bei
Keynesian policies in fact had bee
lan | n under attack practicallysince the publication of The General ThCory and,in a sense, even




public to believe that prosperity could be the result of
governments trickeries instead of the honest sacrifice of present
satisfaction by forward-looking savers.
One would think that the ideas that generated all these
passionate opinions had been clearly stated by Keynes or his
followers, so that one could assess and pass judgment on them in
as definite way as mentioned above. As a matter of fact,
Keynesian policies were taken by these critics as an omnibus
concept that came to include any kind of active intervention in
the economy, from demand managementto nationalization of
industries. This should not besurprisingat all sincesupporters of
Keynes themselves did not always saw eye to eye inthis matter.
It was easyto tell, specially in the 60s, “tight-wing from left-
wing” Keynesians,the latter characteristically proposing policies
to change income-distribution profiles, ample programs of public
investment, progressive tax schemes,etc, that, besides their direct
impact on welfare, could also be said to be Keynesian on the
groundsthat they were policies that would stimulate consumption
and sustain aggregate demand.’ “Right-wing” Keynesians, on the
other hand, would seek income and employmentstability without
touching social structures and minimizing intervention.
Typically, left-wing Keynesians, like, for instance, Galbraith,
would propose demand policies based on government
expenditures to provide public goods to low-income groups,
while right-wing Keynesians, like Walter Heller, would prefer
tax reductions to boost private demand.
Aninfluential book published in 1989 gathered papers on
Keynesian policies from authors of diverse geographical origin
and professionalcapacities (Hall, 1989b). One cannot avoidbeing
surprised by the extent to which different meaningsare attributed
* Boyer (1985) distinguishes between “fundamentalist” and “fine-tuning”
Keynesians, the formerfocused on policies that affected large areas ofthe
economy in contrast to the latter that would just “manage”the existing
structures.
to the expression “Keynesian policies”. Some define them asconsisting of compensatory (anti-cyclical) deficit-spendingpolicies (cf. Pekkarinen, 1989). Others considerthis to
Keynesian policy, taking Keynes to Propose the p
appealto fiscal policy as a meansto prevent the econ
settling down into unemployment equilibria, instead
unemployment (Winch, 1989). Others still take
policies to mean demand management, through fiscal andmonetary measures. For some, it is the emphasis on thegeneration offiscal deficits rather than balanced budgetsthat jscharacteristically Keynesian.‘
An additional measure of confusio
Keynes himself, with his cryptical refere
of The General Theory to the desirabil
“socialization of investment”. Des
of private property and private
“socialization of investment”
and to nationalization.
There can be no doubtthat Keynes was an interventionistand that the policy implicationsofhis General Theory (andotherwritings) are clearly in favor of activist policy-making.It is stillobscure, however, what kind of intervention is favored and towhatextent. Mostofthe time, whatis taken as Keynesian policy
* The editorofthe collection, Peter Hall, seemsto be Situated in a middleground between those views, defined Keynesian policies according toobservanceofthree principles: the appealto aggregate demand manage-mentto sustain employment; emphasis on fiscalpolicyto regulate demand;and 3. the adoption of a counter-cyclical budgetpolicy, seeking deficitsduring recessions and surplusesdurin2 prosperity (Hall, 1989a). Tobin, onthe other hand, offers a Slightly different view, also Suggesting threeprinciples to distinguish Keynesian Policies: 1. to aim at real objectives,instead ofthe nominaltargets pursued by “Classicals”: 2. the use ofdemand
managementpolicies; and 3. coordination offiscal and monetary policies(Tobin, 1985). More recently, Cunnigham and Vilasuso (1994/5) just
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decision-making, some saw in theidea an overture to Socialist ideas




iti nes published much before The
Gene ITheoryorby author thatfreely interpreted what those
volicie should be. More recently, much work has been done
examin: Keynes’s political views, frequently based, however,
onpapers he wrote in his youth. Relatively less attention has
beengive to Keynes’s own proposals madeafter the publication
oFTeeGeneral Theory and, in particular, during the war or
i ion.
Plann eyhistoriansof‘Keynesian thought locate the
immediateorigins of The General Theory Somewhereween
1932/33, when he moved vom suemptingenean omect
i Ss a mor
on classical” roots.Thischanwe was reflected in the drafts of
TheGeneral Theory as well as in papers and pamphlets published
i those years and afterwards. At approximately the sametime,
‘ began producing papers on policy matters that were
lori his new theoretical insights, an effort that lasted until
hisdeathin 1946.In particular, in second world war’s final years
Ke nes took vigorous part in the debate around poser
reconstruction, proposing manypolicy instruments that anne
handy to implement employment-support measures. the
amphlets and memoranda gives us a set of views
arefi. tently at variance with established opinion as to the
nat 2°of Keynesian policies but fit much better with some
‘nterpretations of the core ideas that constitute the Keynesian
revolution, if ever there was one. In this paper, _ne eC
recover the approach to policy developed in those wor . aoe
relate it to the model of a monetary economy propose diately
General Theory and in the debates that happened mame ey
after its publication. Wetry to examine the nature an meansof
intervention that may be seen as inherent to the meory . ni ast
with the popular views of Keynesian policy, particularly
5 Most ofthese papers are published now in CWJMK 27. Pioneers in the
study ofthis material are Kregel (1983) and Wilson (1982).
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that reducesit to deficit-spending. We will see that Keynes wasmuch more aware of someofthe dangers later pointed out byboth right- and left-wingcritics thatit is usually acknowledged.
2. The General Theory: A Model of a Monetary Economy
In 1933, a short paper called “A Monetary ProductionEconomy” cameto light. In the work, Keynes defined his“research program”as consisting in the quest for a meaningfulconcept of monetary economy. Keynesdid not really presentedthe concept butestablished the requirements for its definition. Amonetary economy, he wrote,
“... is an economy in which moneyplays a part of its own
and affects motives and decisions and is, in short, one of theoperative factors in the situation, so that the course of eventscannot be predicted, either in the long period or in the short,without a knowledgeofthe behaviour ofmoney between thefirststate and the last.” (CWJMK, 13, Pp. 408/9, emphases added)
A little earlier, Keynes seems to havestated in a lecture:
“On my view, there is no unique long-periodequilibrium equally valid regardless Ofthe characterof the monetary authority.” (CWJMK, 29, p. 55)
POSition of
ofthe policy
The need for sucha specific concept ofmonetary ecwas dueto the fact that: ry €conomy
“The idea that it is comparative]
. easy do
hypothetical conclusions of ar. Y easy adapt theeal wage economics to the req]world of monetary economics is a mistake.” a410) €. (CWIMK, 13, p.
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From Keynes’s work from that time onwards, one can
retrieve the elements that defined a monetary economy
(Carvalho, 1992). This is a private property economy where
production and investmentdecisions are taken and carried out by
firms whose sole goal is “to end up with more money than it
started with.” (CWJMK, 29, p. 89) Firms, thus, aim at
accumulating money rather than goods(id., p. 82). On the other
hand, consumers (andsavers) also aim at earning money incomes
and accumulating money wealth. Keynes does not rely on any
kind of monetary illusion. His argument as to why economic
agents prefer the money form is double.Firstly, as in the Clower
aphorism, money buy goods and goods buy money, but goods do
not buy goods. Thereis, thus, a preference for money becauseit
is a means of payment. On the other hand, “money in terms of
whichthe factors of production are remunerated will ‘keep’ more
readily than the output which they are being remunerated to
produce” (id., p. 86), which explains the preference for liquid
forms of wealth. Keynes pointed outlater that it is with respect
to the role of money as an asset that the most important
difficulties arose for Classical economists. The reason was that,
according to Keynes, they could not deal properly with the
problem of uncertainty as opposedto calculable risk. Uncertainty
can not be measured. Underthese circumstances, since one
cannot write insurance policies against the uncertainties of
economic life, it is necessary to develop other defensive
strategies. Holding money,stated Keynes, is the most common
of these strategies.
In short, the distinctive feature of a monetary economyis
that money is not neutral. It affects its short period position
through two main channels:i. to demand a commodity or service
one needs money;ii. one can just hold moneyinstead of having
® There is already
a
vastliterature on Keynes’s views on uncertainty and
how his concept was to be contrasted to the one accepted by orthodox
economists. This authordiscussedthis point in Carvalho (1992), chapter4.
to spend it buying commodities, thus subtracting from totaldemand. More importantly, however, money was notneutral alsowith respect to long period Positions, and this was due to moneybeing a form of wealth in a monetary economy. As an asset,money competes with other assets, affecting the accumulationpath of the economy,and thus the determinants ofits actual longterm performance. In a world of uncertainty andprivate property,money is a safe form of wealth. Being purchasing power,it is ageneral representative of social wealth in contrast with specificforms of wealth represented by specific commodities, as Marxput it long before Keynes. For this reason, money “lulls thedisquietude” of wealth-holders (CWJMK, 14, p. 116). Beingrisky in its actual returns, capital assets have to offer somecompensation in order to compete with money, as wealth-holdersdemand some kind of payment to part with the Safety of theirmoney wealth.
Uncertainty affects the value
plant and equipment produce specifi
be demandedby customers.’ Onthe
very illiquid so that their possessor jis likely to suffer capitallosses if he/she tries to sell them to move to other activitiesThus, capital assets are plagued both by income uncertainty andby illiquidity. Money,in contrast, is in a Privileged position withrespect to these risks. In Keynes’s words:
S of capital assets because¢ goods that mayor may notother hand, capital goods are
7One cannot ignore that most ofthe properties that make ofmoneyan assetwereacutely perceived by Marx. For instance, the characterofmoney asgeneral form ofwealth was clearly pointed outin Marx’s Grundrisse: “
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“The convenience of holding assets in the same standard
as that in whichfuture liabilities mayfall due and in a standard
in terms of which the future cost of living is expected to be
relatively stable, is obvious.” (Keynes, 1964, pp. 236/7)
Moneyis the basis for the creation of a system of (explicit
or implicit) contracts that allow time-consumingcapitalist
production to develop (cf. Davidson, 1978). To remain as the
basis for setting prices and writing contracts over time money
cannot disappoint their holders’ expectations as to the
fundamentalstability of its value, that is, its purchasing power.
Moneyhasto remain liquid:it is convertible into anything, since
it is the means of payment of the economy, but its value must
also be basically stable. To guarantee its liquidity, Keynes
argued, money has to have certain properties: low or negligible
elasticities of production and of substitution.(Keynes, 1964, p.
241n) But these properties cause an increase in the demand for
money to be a subtraction from the demandfor goods that cannot
be compensated for an increase of employmentin the production
of money. The possibility of accumulating irreproducible wealth
instead of labor-produced goodsis the core of Keynes’s principle
of effective demand, something, he wrote, that can only happen
in a monetary economy.
The consequencesofthis reasoning are that: 1. money can
influence the volume of employment, and not only its direction,
because of the possibility that the public prefers to hold money
instead of demanding goodseither for present consumption orto
provide for future consumption, that is, one can accumulate
wealth without investing (Keynes, 1964, p. vii); 2. one can no
longer define the long period positions of the economy without
The
termstability is here proposed notin the sense of no changein the
actual purchasing power of money butthat the elasticity of inflationary
expectationsis zero or negligible.
taking into consideration the behavior ofmoney betweenthefirstmomentandthelast.
In sum,in a monetary economy agents can choose betweenmoney and goods as meansofwealth accumulation. Moneyis anasset becausein private Property economiesto get hold ofmoneyis a safe way to keep claimsonthe social product. Any societyis plagued by uncertainty, but the latter has a Particular influencein monetary economies because in these economiesoneis free todecide on the ways to accumulate butis also the onlyresponsiblefor the outcomesofhis/her decision. One reaps the benefits andthe losses of one’s acts. The test of the social validation of agiven individual’s choice as to how to accumulate wealth is hiscapacity to convert his/her wealth into money,that is, into powerto commanda shareofthe social product. Uncertainty and money
contractionary impact throughout the ec
economies, variable aggregate demand
income is endogenously determined.
multiplier, a central element of Keynesia
onomy. In monetary
implies that nationalThis is known as theN macroeconomics. It is
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under certain conditions, demand for other types of assets,
including capital goods, mayshrink to the point of disappearance.
3. The Need for Intervention
In the final chapter of The General Theory, Keynes
identified the two evils of modern capitalism as being an
excessive degree of income concentration and the system’s
incapacity to sustain the full employment of its workers and
productive capacity. Keynes considered the latter problem to be
the worst, since ways could be devised to attenuate inequalities.
Keynes, like Schumpeter, did not consider complete equality as
a goal because different rewards should accrue to people on
accountoftheir differences in effort, efficiency, aversionto risks,
etc. The problem wasnot that income was concentrated but that
it was concentrated beyond what is adequate in view of those
factors and to stimulate enterprise. In particular, because of
inheritance rights, for instance, wealth concentration was to a
large extent unrelated to economic performance. The tax system
should be oriented to correct these unjustified sources of
inequality.
As to the incapacity to sustain full employment, the
problem was much more complicated. Effective demand could
be too low, with respect to productive potential, because
uncertainty is pervasive and in a modern system of private
property, responsibilities for decisions falls on the individual,
that benefits from the rewards for his/her successes but also pays
for the disappointments. Agents thus seek for safe havens against
the uncertainties surrounding any given choice as to definite
means of wealth accumulation looking for safety against capital
losses in the form of money. The same stable moneythat allows
the organization ofan efficient productive system is what creates
the possibility that income generated in the productive process
does not return to the market as demand for the output produced.
Money is a general form of wealth that allows individuals to
postponeindefinitely the potentially fateful decisions involved inthe choice of specific goods to accumulate. For the individual,thus, is a valid object of rational choice, notwithstanding thedamages it may cause to society as a whole.
It is this contradiction between individual and socialrationality that creates the need for intervention. If uncertaintiescannot be eliminated and must be borne byindividuals onecannot expect that solutions emerge spontaneously, Somethingmustbe donefrom theoutside of the economy.
Keynes wascareful to point out that effective demandproblems were not caused byrelative price imbalances or bydifficulties to allocate currently produced goods. He subscribedto the Marshallian view thatallocation of goodsand services wasto be ultimately decided by private agents receiving price signalsfrom the markets. Elimination of private Property to transferallocative decisionsto the State was explicitly rejected by Keynes(cf. Keynes, 1964, p. 378). The flaw in the system had to do ahrelative prices, but of asset Prices. It was in the allocation ofassets among wealth-holders that markets failed. The burden afed returnsofcapital g00ds weighed toon of their demand Prices, making them afrequently inferior choice, dominated by Money, whosereturn inthe form of safety was highly valued when uncertainty increasedIn other words, because of uncertainty the i
in contrast with the incomeS of insufficient aggregate
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demand cannot be eliminated nor can it be mitigated by private
initiative alone or just by changing somerules ofthe game,like
introducing taxes on inheritance. Money cannot be neutralized
without changing the very properties of capitalism that respond
forits positive qualities. Private responsibility cannot be replaced
by other formsof decision.It is, on the other hand, implied by
these rules that, left to themselves, individuals would tend to
seek particular forms of defense that could only aggravate the
final situation. As Keynes put it, in monetary economies full
employment can only be reached by accident or by deliberate
design,that is, by State policy.
4. The Possibility of Intervention
Just to spot a systemic flaw is not, in itself, enough to
justify State intervention. To call for Governmentaction it is
also necessary, and one should notice this is an independent
assumption,to acceptthat the State is capable of dealing with the
problem in a moreefficient way. In other words, to point out that
private agents are not capable by themselves of sustaining full
employment does not meanthe State could dobetter to solve the
problem. The solution may well be beyond the possibility of
conscious intervention.
This was in fact the view of most of business cycle
theorists, that used to assumethat recessions were the necessary
consequence ofprosperity, even to the point of suggesting that
they perform somekind ofcleansing operation on the productive
sector, ridding it of non-competitive firms. Recessions would
eventually dissipate, just to reappear after the next prosperity
phase and nothing could or should be done aboutit. This is also
the view of natural-rate-of-employment theorists for whom
employment fluctuations result from a changing assessment of
the relative advantages of working and ofleisure on the part of
workers or from the impact of exogenousvariables. In both cases,
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governments’ attempts to intervene would only worsen the
prospects of recovery.
The strongest criticism of intervention by government in
the economycertainly came out in the old controversy on the
possibility of socialist economies to work properly. The central
argument, that was later developed by Hayek, refers to the
information necessary for the government to act, which is much
more complex than that required by any private individual.! An
agent is concerned only with his own neighborhood A
government would deal with whole economies. This conitrovers
however, referred to the possibilities of substitution of central
planning for the price mechanism. Whatever one may conclud
from that debate, we should notice that the Keynesian problem i
muchless complex than the problem of determination of the ot
of relative values of commodities in the absence of market
mechanism:it consists in how to sustain capital asset prices :
face of contractionary pressures on them rooted in the inten: ity
of the uncertainty that surrounds private commitments. Ke nes
as already mentioned, explicitly rejected the idea of lini ee
private property and market mechanisms."! wun
In fact, the Gordian knot wascut even further. We
conceive at last three possible kinds of policy to solvethe
Keynesian problem: 1. the State could assume a we
responsibility for investment decisions; 2. the state could in
give special favors to private investment in chosen ares : ae
state could seek to affect overall private investment b Re at
a safer economic environmentwithin which private a
be stimulated to make riskier choices than just ace i
liquid assets. Thefirst policy, that sometake to be theae
of Keynes’s proposalto “socialize investment”, goes sGainatiieie




'° See Hayek (1949),particularly chapter 4
"! Even though he took the belief in the ca
: : ‘ aci
allocation with a grain ofsalt. See section Pacity of markets to promote5.iv, below.
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Keynesputit, the point was to make free enterprise work, not t
o
kill it.!2 The secondline of policy would involvethe state
directly
in the process of resource allocation, something that in prin
ciple
could require more information that governmentsu
sually have at
their disposal, although more restricted experiment
s with
industrial policies should not be discarded." It is the th
ird kind
of policy that was advanced by Keynes. In a series ofart
icles
published in The Times in early 1937, Keynes
recognized the
difficulty of substituting government planning of
investments for
private accumulation decisions. The role of government
should
not be to take the place of private markets to
assume the
determination of private investments. Intervention
should be
designed to boost aggregate demand thereby red
ucing overall
uncertainty as to the prospects for the whole econo
my.
The ideal macroeconomic policy proposed by Keynes
would in way inflate aggregate demand, expanding the
economy
like a balloon, leaving to private agents the decisions
as to how
the available resources would be employed.In short, th
e effective
demand problem is that capital asset values, as we sa
w, are
unfavorably affected by income uncertainty and illiquid
ity.
Boosting aggregate demand reduces both risks and so it should
raise demandpricesof that kind of asset with respect to money.
A rising wave would notlift all boats, but it was mainly to
private agents to decide which boats should float and which ones
should sink.'4 To do it, the government should implement
investments of their own, in projects that would not compete
 
12] have not abandonedthe view that somethinglikefree enterprise can be
madeto work.” (CWJMK,27, p. 354)
3 One should remember,for instance, Keynes interventionsin the debate
on the coalindustry,in the twenties, and, moreparticularly,his discussion
of commercial policy to be adopted after the second world war. S
ee
CWIJMK,19 and 26, respectively, for each of these debates.
4 Again,this did notprecludedindustrial policies from influencing
allocation
when deemed wise. The pointis that it would not be a macroec
onomic
policy.
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with private investment, creating thereby an environmentfavorable to private initiative, regulating the pace of investmentsaccording to the need to compensate private demandfailures toSustain a stable level of aggregate demand overtime.Keynes was a firm believer in the Possibility that anenlightened government could implementsuch policies. He alsobelieved that The General Theory had finally laid the foundationsfor the development of scientific macr iA few years earlier, Keynes had welcomed the creation of aneconomic advisory bodyto the Prime Minister with these words:
“... @ move along these lines would indeed be an act of
The Possibility of planning, i
intervention plans to compensate for
 
'S See,for instance, CWJMK 27, pp 264 Ss, Particularly p. 269
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385/8). These political concerns, besides considerations of
efficiency, would also lead Keynes to propose in his Essays in
Persuasion that these investments should be implemented by
semi-autonomous bodies,entities that were not private but were
vernmentitself.
m a oneRevise believed in the need and the possibility for
governmentintervention. The meansto intervene, however, were
quite different from what was known at the time and came out
to be quite different from what one imagined, after the war,
should be Keynesian policies.
5. The Patterns of Intervention
A consequence of the preceding argument is that the
particular character of Keynes’s policy proposals consistsin the
definition of a set of measuresdesignedto reduce or socialize the
uncertainties that surround economic decisions and to boost
aggregate demand throughstate intervention whenprivate
demandfailed. In this way, the state could contribute to create a
stable environment, more favorable to private investments.
Governments cannot, of course, create stable microeconomic
contexts. Agents muststill run the risks associated with their
accumulation choices, to benefit from their eventual successes,
Governments can, however, reduce or eliminate global or
macroeconomicrisks, those that affect the economy as a whole
and that may punish even those individuals whose decisions
would be adequate in microeconomicterms. Thatis the point of
Keynes’s policies. The governmenthasatits disposal an arsenal
of measures to act upon the Overall level of activity. The
information to do it is or can be available, which is not
necessarily the case ofthe information needed for microeconomic
intervention. As uncertainty is pervasive and can flow through
many channels, all levers must be pulled to assure that the
economywill be kept in a Prosperousstate. Keynesian policies
must consist of concerted actions in a multiplicity of arenas.
The need for comprehensive and concerted action is an
aspect of Keynes’s policy proposals that is often forgotten,
specially by those who concentrate their attention exclusively onfiscal measures. Uncertainty can affect the economy in many
ways. Consumers mayfear for their incomes,the prices of goods
and services, their availability, etc. Entrepreneurs may have to
face technological innovations, creation of new good, changes in
tastes or in the availability of means of production and labor, inthe access to markets, etc. Uncertainties maybe generated by thestate Intervention itself: economies where aggregate demand is
leadtehi tee inflation-prone, higher state expenditures may
policies T oe or to higherinterest rates if suitable monetary
distributed n° implemented, competitive advantages may be
Uncertainty-redycineose, as 3 result of public spending, ete.manyfronts to ane intervention requires concerted action in
deviating eee at local Orsectional policies end up just
effectively tedagine Tom Its original points of impact insteadof
Keynesian policie 8 It. In this sense, it is better to identifyKeynesian S instead of a Keynesian fiscal policy or a
monetary policy. Even though specific
aoewar be madefor each one of these fields, it is
of e, ure of macroeconomic managementthatis
._“e¥NeS’s approach, rather than any particularuse of anyparticular policy ;
cHimitene Policy instrument. The choice offields and
the comprehe;
characteristic
efficiency. Use each tool with its maximum
Purely macroeconomic 10
conceived. Th Policies, in any case, can hardly be
texto para discussdo - iei/ufyj
policy must reside precisely in the capacity of devising policies
for which sucheffects are either minimized or, if it be the case,
are consciously sought for, as it may happen whensectional
bottlenecks emerge or depressed areasare targeted for uplifting.
Keynes’s writings on economicpolicy, even on policy to
smoothout general fluctuations, are numerous. We are concerned
here with a subset of these works, those produced from the early
thirties when the core model of The General Theory wasatlast
defined. Two groups of worksare ofparticular interest: 1. the
three articles published by Keynes in The Timesin early 1937,
specifying policy proposals to maintain prosperity;'* 2. the
memoranda and other papers written during the war, specially
those aimedat post-warreconstruction, collected in volume 27 of
Keynes’s writings. From these papers one can extract the pieces
that may be put together to show how the concerted action
mentioned above could be implemented.
i. Fiscal Policy!”
Activist fiscal policy, the conscious appeal to the state
taxing and spending powers to influence aggregate demand, is
the best knowninstrumentof Keynesian policy. One needs not to
subscribe the fiscalist approach typical of the neo-classical
synthesis Keynesians to realize that the main responsibility for
maintaining macroeconomicstability is to be borne by fiscal
policy measures. As wewill see below, Keynesdid not doubtthe
efficacy of monetary measures but the wiseness of relying on
interest rate changes as a tool for stabilizing income.
Fiscal policy is a very powerful lever to push aggregate
demand up or downbecauseit causes private income to change
 
'© The three letters are published as an appendix to Hutchison (1977).
'’ This section is heavily influenced by Kregel (1983). See also Wilson
(1982). The author has explored some ofthese arguments in Carvalho
(1992), chapter 12.
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in a direct way. It increases or decreases incomefor those that
supply goodsandservicesto satisfy governments’ demands (and
for those who pay taxes), triggering a multiplier effect through
the impact on the latter’s expenditures. In particular, spending
policies may have a direct impact on the demandforreal capital
assets (if expectations are not affected adversely): 1. on the one
hand,it raises its demand prices, since higher aggregate demand
improvestherisk situation forall investors; 2. it also acts through
improving the liquidity position of those who have debts
outstanding, which we could call a Minskyeffect.
To implement an activist fiscal policy, the government
should prepare twofiscal budgets, onefor the ordinary functions
of public administration, the other for the governments’
discretionary expenditures. The ordinary budget, Keynes
recommended, should be balancedatall times (CWJMK27,p.
225). There should be routine sources of finance for these
expenditures to ensure that, in times of prosperity, when
aggregate demand was high, the performance of the normal
functions of government would not create any inflationary
pressure on the economy. The ordinary budget was to be
calculated without direct concern for stabilization needs. The
discretionary, or capital, budget was the fiscal lever the
government would have atits disposal to push the economy
toward full employmentor to keepit there. This budget would
cover investment activities that could be accelerated or
decelerated according to the generalstate of business. Because of
the possibly long lag betweenthe decision to intervene and the
implementation of the investment plan, the government should
have plans in the shelf ready for action at the first signs of
cooling off of the economy.'® The pace of these investments
would be set according to the need of sustaining aggregate
' Asthe prince ofDenmark onceputit, “the readinessis all” (Act 5, scene
2).
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demand, although Keynes did recognize that there may be
technical difficulties in the way of this change of pace.'?
Similar investments-plans-in-the-shelf should be kept by
local governments and the semi-autonomous bodies Keynes had
already mentioned in the twenties, also to be put in action when
the times required it. They would workin similar ways as to the
capital budget, with some possible advantages however in terms
of agility and political accountability.
Fiscal policy could also contribute to increase demand
throughredistributive measures that could push consumption up.
Keynes was very creative to devise reforms to redistribute
wealth, the boldest of which was the compulsory loans proposed
at the beginning of second world war.?° The schemewasinitially
just a stabilization program that would promote someinter-
temporal distribution of purchasing power, transferring, through
the compulsory loan, excess demand power from the high-
employment war period to the occasion, that was expected to
comeafter the war was over, when aggregate demand would sag.
Gradually, however, it evolved from an emergency schemeto a
broad program ofsocial reform, aiming both at reducing wealth
concentration and at smoothing out aggregate demand behavior.?!
The samereasonsareat least partly to explain Keynes’s “wild
enthusiasm” for the social security proposals contained in the
Beveridge Report (cf. CWJMK 27, pp. 204, 215, 225).
" See CWJMK27, p. 322, and also pp. 122, 268.
* See “How to Pay for the War” in CWJMK9. Keynes’s contributionsto
the public debate around that paper is in CWJMK 22.
*! Repaymentofthe loans shouldbe partly financed bycapitallevies,cf.
CWIJMK22,pp. 123, 138 and CWIMK 28, p. 138.
* One should rememberthatstabilization policies may be neededagainst
excess aggregate demandtoo.It is in this particular circumstancethat
compulsoryloans could showits power, especially when workersarealert
to costof livingrises and may respondto price increases by demanding
higher wages. See CWJMK22,pp. 121, 260. Keynes expected the same
help from the establishmentof a welfare net, to be financed by taxes that
could be cyclically-sensitive.
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The examination of the measures themselves should notdivert out attention that ultimately the success of the plans wasto be measured not necessarily by the volume of investmentactually made by the government, and even less by the amountof deficit-spending made, but by the capacity to show toprivateagents that government was capable of intervening. The capitalbudget could be in deficit, but deficit-spending is not theinstrument, but a result contingent on the behavior of taxrevenues, dependent themselves on the speed with which theeconomy reacts to the stimuli represente
Investments made by the government. |expenditure, not deficit-
successfulinitiative should
incomes could be sustain
d by the increase in
Nn principle, it is the
spending, that really matters. A
convince private agents that aggregate
ed, reducing their uncertainties and
enditure Plan could,in fact, never have
ides, even if implemented, it could
ues to fundit. Deficit Spending was no
strument. In Keynes’s words:
generate enoughtax reven
more than a last resort in
Play if the machinery of capi
” pital budgetting (sic haddown.” (CWJMK 27, p. 352, emphases adder ) had broken
 




to a desired degree of socialization of investment has been an
enduring enigma. For some, it related to the creation of the
“semi-autonomousbodies”, something like public companies, to
promote investments even when it could not beattractive to
private entrepreneurs. For others, like Tobin, Keynes could be
thinking of the kind of planning that came to be adopted in
France after the war (Tobin, 1987, p. 8). Indicative planning, as
it was called, consisted in orienting and stimulating private
investment towards specific areas targeted for development.
Seeking voluntary adhesion on the part of private firms, it was
contrasted to the compulsory planning of command economies.
ii. Monetary Policy
For many, Keynes’s contribution to economic policy
consisted in showing that money does not matter and that only
fiscal policy can effectively influence aggregate demand.”
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. Keynes
devoted most of his professional life to devising monetary
arrangements, institutions and policies that could contribute to
reaching and maintaining full employment.It is, in any case, true
that after The General Theory his conception of an activist
monetary policy became something of a paradox. In short, he
proposed that to be effective, monetary policy has to be used
sparingly. Keynes argued that interest rates are essentially
conventional. People are supposed to form a view as to whatis
the normalrate of interest and to expect that actual rates gravitate
around that level. Those that judge the actual rate to be higher
than the normal rate, take measures to anticipate a future
reduction of the interest rate, and conversely.It is through the
anticipation of expected movements of the rates of interest that
monetary policy acts. Of course, in Keynes’s view, normalrates
have nothing to do with natural rates or any other conceptof this
 
* See,for instance, Buchanan (1987), pp. 132/4.
texto para discussdo - iei/ufrj 25
kind. Normality is a subjective concept, related to an individual’sexperience. Divergence of opinion as to what is normal is anessential element of Keynes’s liquidity preference theory ofinterest rates,
Beit as it may, peopleare influenced by what theysee inthe markets when formingtheir idea of whatis normal. Forthisreason, an employment-stabilizing monetary policy shouldinform the public that the normalrates are low and will continueto be low in the future. Otherwise, when cheap money wasneeded, the monetary authorities could find it difficult to keep
poms through other means (CWJMK21, chapter 5; Keynes,
ofthe Treasury,it]les within theirpower,





An important condition for this power to be exercised was
to avoid to try imposing the government’s own liquidity
preferences on the public. The kind of securities that should be
placed had to be designed to satisfy the general public demand
in order to avoid having to offer higher interest rates to
sate for lower liquidity.*
»One interesting aspect of Keynes’s monetary policy was
his discussion of the need for secrecy. Contrary to what became
accepted by orthodox economists, Keynes defended openness,
not secrecy, as a condition for monetary policy to be effec Ne
(cf. CWIMK 20, pp. 158, 262/3). A monetary economy cou
settle down on any one of many possible equilibrium states.
Authorities should signal to agents which position was targets .
The clearer the directions government could give, the quic cr
and smoother should be the move towards the desired goal.
Modern orthodox economists, on the other hand, believe that
market economies tend to move spontaneously towards 2
uniquely determined equilibrium position, that corresponding to
the natural rate of unemployment.In this case, governments can
only move the economy away from that position by misleading
agents into thinking that the foundations for their decisions are
different from whatthey really are. Secrecy as to the true nature
of those policies becomes, thus, a condition for its effectiveness.
by the exercise of the moderation, the gradualness, and the discreet
handling ofthe marketofwhich they have shown themselves to beme
to make the long-term rate ofinterest whattheychoose within reason.” (id.,
p. 73, emphases added). Keynes repeated the statement in 1945, now
without so many preconditions: “The monetary authorities can have any
rate of interest they like.” (CWJMK 27, p. 390). One should remember,
anyway, that Keynes was favorable to the maintenance of controls on
exchangeand on the movementofcapitalafter the war.
*6 See CWJMK 21, ch. 2; 22,p. 414; 27, p. 392.
texto para discussdo - iei/ufrj 27
it. Price and Wages Policies
The maintenance of high levels of aggregate demandobviously increased risk of the emergence of inflationarypressures andKeynes, contrary to another popular view, was notoblivious to it. Already in A Treatise on Money, Keynes haddiscussed the Possibility of what he called income inflationcaused by increases in efficiency wages.2” Cost pressures aremuch harder to contain under full employment (cf. CWJMK 27p. 417), and Keynes devised means to ensure that also in thisfront uncertainties could be reduced by concerted action
fluctuate, in an amplified way, with the business cycle. On theother hand Specific arran. , gements hadwith the problem of money wages, ad to be developed to deal
As to raw materials, an
 
*"Notto be confused with mod
New Keynesians.
*CWJMK 27, p. 114. Sincem> . any de : :
the export revenues of raw materialrevdwants dependdirectly onege a e e
i
stabilize internationaltrade, by smoothingounaso contribute to
ntries’ incomes.
for instance,
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As to wages, things looked more difficult. The
determination of wages involved much morethan just economic
elements. In The General Theory, Keynes showed himself to be
very skeptical about the efficiency of market mechanisms to
determine wages. Undersustained full employment, things would
be even moredifficult in this front, because “[t]he task of keeping
efficiency wages reasonably stable... is a political rather than an
economic problem” (CWJMK 26, p. 38) and the employment
policies would certainly increase the political power of workers.
Devising wagespolicies was sure to be very difficult. Discussing
the issue during the war, when full employment had been
achieved and the emergence of inflationary pressures were a
distinct possibility, observed Keynes:
“It is obvious that wage policy raises far-reaching
psychological and political issues. It can only be handled by a
simple, trustful and imaginative policy which covers a widerfield
than technicalfinance.” (CWJMK 22, p. 223)
Keynes recognized that the use of incomes policy to
stabilize money incomes should involve some kind of quid pro
quo:
“The standstill of wage rates, etc. could be accompanied
by other measures aimed at making the programme as a whole
socially just and politically acceptable. [Again] The choice of
such measures is mainly a psychological and political problem
w.” (id, p. 261)
For many of Keynes’s followers, including neo-classical
synthesis Keynesians, incomes policies had to be a natural
complement of stabilization policies.” It is not entirely clear
whether Keynes would have proposed permanent incomes
 
° See,e.g., Tobin (1985), p. 116, and Weintraub (1978).
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policies and of what kind. The conscience of the difficultiesinvolved in outlining wagepolicies led Keynaction to contain prices exact!
wagerises that would be muc
22, pp. 7, 9). Nevertheless,it i
Saw some kind of incomes p
es to often propose
y to prevent them from provoking
h harderto control (e.g., CWJIMK
S reasonably safe to assume Keynes
olicy as part of the required arsenalin a monetary economy. At least once, Keynes had theopportunity to indicate his preference for something other thanj i i market mechanisms. Discussing the
f Great Britain’s return to the gold
ynes concluded:
a whole, and Without attentionconsequences to individual oups.” (CWJIMK 9,Dp. 223/4)
Snes. (CHIR
Needless to say, Keynes subscribed the first of thesetheories.
iv. Other Policies
the Price system when dealingNg Certain industries, For Keynes,
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comparative advantages were not extensible to manufacture
(CWJMK 26, pp. 262/3, 264), and prices themselves eee
always be good indices of social needs (CWJMK 26, p. 2 ».
The respect for the operation of markets did not exclude <
appeal to instruments like meamposition Oounport quotas an
circulation of financial capital. .
snxchange policies, on the other hand, were a nclong
interest of Keynes’s. He authored manyblueprints or rems,
including his Bancor Plan, presented at Bretton Woo . gain,
reduction of uncertainties and the promotion of employment
through the creation of an elastic supply of intemationa means
of payment were at the center of his concerns. The idea sy m
would combine the drive to creating a situation in which na tone
authorities would be autonomous to tackle their jones ic
problems with initiatives to coordinate actions to stal ne
international trade and capital movements. Rules and flexibi iy
to adapt were the passwords. Therules devised by Keynes in Hs
Bancor Plan would impose the sharing of responsibilities or e
elimination of balance of payments disequilibria between de tor
and creditor countries instead of laying all the burden “
adjustment on the shoulders of the former. Besides, it wou
establish fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates. Its most
distinctive feature, perhaps, was the creation of an international
means of payment, the bancor, a type of credit moneyto used
exclusively by central banks. An International Clearing non
would manage the system, as a bank, issuing bancors w '
international trade was taking place. In case of need, coun
could enjoy overdraft facilities put at their disposal by t in - :
financed by the balances of surplus countries, to go roen
temporary disequilibria or to gain breathing space was
implementing more fundamental adjustments in their exte
wrotethis occasion to Marcus Fleming:“I did not say that you
should not be attached to the price system.(I share your attachment.) I said
you should not be deceivedbyit.” (CWJMK 26,p. 297).
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positions. This wasa crucial element of Keynes’s plan. It wouldsubstitute the bankingprinciple, that allows credit expansion, forthe hoarding of foreign exchange reserves, and its contractionaryconsequences on economic activity.
6. Conclusions
We proposed in this paper that Keynes’s stand as to theneed for macroeconomic policy results from two sets ofassumptions. Firstly, the concept of monetary economy, ormonetary production economy, marked by the possibility ofeffective demand failures because hon-producible money candominate labor-using capital assets as a means to accumulatewealth. Secondly, that governments are able to assess the natureof these failures and to effectively attack them.The effective demand failures are explained by theproperties money has in a private-property market economy.Private activities are surrounded by uncertainties and moneyServes as a Safe haven against them. Keynes had been concernedwith the impact of uncertainty on economic activity for all hislife as an economist. In 1926, for instance, he wrote:
also the cause of the Unem; Ployment of I,disappointment of reasonable hy; y f Labour or the





“Yet the cure lies outside the operations of individuals;it
may even be to the interest of individuals to aggravate the
disease.” (id., p. 318)
The contradiction between individual andsocial rationality
opened the possibility of state intervention in ue economy.
Keynes believed that The General Theory was capa ‘ Oo ew8
the necessary analytical tools to make a diagnosis of the pro ior
of effective demand andto developits cure. To fight unee aunty
and ignorance, a comprehensive and concerted set oa ons
should be taken, to sustain aggregate demanda and to re ue _
risks of economic activity perceived by the individua S. .
successful, these policies would raise ine demand prices
i d stimulate its accumulation. 7
seasttoboost aggregate demand these macropolicies shouts
act on the economyas a whole, without concem for how i .
structured. In fact, it is not possible to devise such a policy not
is it clear that one should nottry also to promote some structural
improvements. The Keynesian approach tothis question Seems
be rather pragmatic, dodging more ideological Procea 10 ne
any case,the state is expected to complement, rather thanak
private enterprise. As Keynesputit in a posthumouslyPu nee
Paper, judging the need for intervention that could perhap
summarize his goals:
“Here is an attempt to use what we have learnt from
modern experience and modern analysis, not to defeat, put9
implement the wisdom ofAdam Smith.” (Keynes, 1946, p.
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